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NOTES
THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT AND COERCIVE SPEECH
Introduction
The first major piece of labor legislation enacted in this country,
the Wagner Act,' had for its purpose the protection of labor's right
to organize and the encouragement of collective bargaining.2 This
Act contained no provision dealing with the right of free speech of
either employer or employee, for it seemed, at the time, unnecessary
to add to the Constitutional guaranty embodied in the First Amend-
ment.8 The inevitable clash of interests between labor and manage-
ment, however, brought into focus the necessity for considering
possible limitations on that guaranty in the field of labor relations.
This task was undertaken by the National Labor Relations Board 4
in the first instance, and is reviewable by the federal courts.
Among the five unfair labor practices prohibited by the Wagner
Act was any interference, restraint or coercion of employees in the
exercise of their protected rights.8 During the life of the original
Act, employers had consistently voiced their dissatisfaction with the
enforcement of this prohibition, claiming that their Constitutional
right of free speech was being abridged.6 Statutory protection was
therefore advocated. Consequently, when the Act was amended in
1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act,7 a specific subsection, Section 8(c),
provided that the expression of any views, arguments or opinions
shall not constitute or be evidence of unfair practice unless they con-
tain a threat of reprisal or a promise of benefit.8
Almost six years have elapsed since the enactment of Section
8(c), the "free speech provision." Although there are a number of
aspects to its operation, the present discussion will be confined to the
method of distinguishing between coercive and non-coercive speech.
149 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §§ 151 et seq. (1946) (National Labor
Relations Act).
2Ibid.; MILLIs-BRowx, FRom THE WAGNER AcT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 3
(1950).
s U. S. CONST. AMEND. I.
4 As provided in the Act: 49 STAT. 451 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 153 (1946).
549 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158(1) (1946).6 MILLIS-BRowN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 174.
7 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. §§ 141 et seq. (Supp. 1950) (Labor-
Management Relations Act).
861 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 158(c) (Supp. 1950).
Coercive Speech Under the Wagner Act
It was conceded that, under the original Act, the employer had
a right to express his views on unions and union matters so long as
his expressions could not be said to interfere with the employees'
rights to organize.9 This was an idle admission, however, because
in practice, the Board considered the economic power which an em-
ployer wields over his employees, and expressions which were no more
than mere opinion or argument were adjudged coercive 13 These
decisions were upheld by the courts. 1 In NLRB v. Federbush,12
Judge Learned Hand stated that, while an employer is generally as
free as anyone else to voice his feelings against trade-unions, his free-
dom will be restricted when his audience is composed of persons de-
pendent upon him for their livelihood. In such a situation, it was
said, his statements may have a more sinister effect than they would
have if spoken to non-employees. 13
Under this early test an employer's speech was considered from
two aspects: first, as a mere expression of conviction which would
be protected by the First Amendment, and second, as a statement of
his views which employees may think it detrimental to disregard.14
If the latter aspect predominated to an extent deemed coercive, which
it could be said to do in almost every case, the Board would enjoin
such communications. i5
In 1941 the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Virginia Electric &
Power Company,'6 established more liberal principles. The Court,
reversing the Board's finding of unfair practice based solely upon
speeches not in themselves coercive, recognized that these speeches
9 See Continental Box Co. v. NLRB, 113 F. 2d 93 (5th Cir. 1940).
lo Lightner Publishing Co., 12 N. L. R. B. 1255 (1939) ; Tennessee Copper
Co., 9 N. L. R. B. 117 (1938); Hoover Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 688 (1938). In
the latter case a letter from management to employees was held to constitute
interference wherein the strongest language was as follows:
It seems in order to suggest that labor organizers are prompted in
their efforts by the fees they collect from those who join the organizations
they are promoting.
It is well to remember that long drawn out strikes are usually settled
on a basis whereby more has been lost by factory employees than is gained
through increased pay schemes or improved working conditions. Id. at 691.
11 See NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S. 584 (1941); International Asso-
ciation of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 72 (1940). "Slight suggestions
as to the employer's choice between unions may have a telling effect among
men who know the consequences of incurring that employer's strong dis-
pleasure." Id. at 78.
12121 F. 2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941).
13 "What to an outsider will be no more than the vigorous presentation of a
conviction, to an employee may be the manifestation of a determination which
it is not safe to thwart." Id. at 957.
14 See Cox, CASas oN LABoR LAw 401 (2d ed. 1951).
15 See note 10 supra.
16 314 U. S. 469 (1941).
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would constitute unfair practice only if considered in the light of the
totality of the company's activities, anti-union background and other
acts of interference. 17  Upon remand of the case, the Board con-
sidered the same speeches in conjunction with the facts suggested by
the Supreme Court, and again enjoined them. This same finding
was then upheld on appeal upon different grounds.' 8 An employer's
right to express his opinions was thus given some effect, while the
principle was established that speech, not in itself coercive, may be-
come such when considered in the light of other influencing factors.
This test, referred to as the "totality of conduct" doctrine, was
employed in NLRB v. American Tube Bending Company.19 It was
there held that utterances not by themselves of a threatening nature,
were not violative of the Act where no other influencing facts ap-
peared in the record. Subsequent cases before the Board and the
courts were decided with this test as a guide.20  The inherent diffi-
culty with its application, however, was that so much depended upon
the particular fact situations presented, and consequently, reliance
upon precedent was limited to analogy. By 1947, due perhaps to
the growing strength of labor organizations, there was an apparent
tendency for the Board to require stronger evidence of collateral facts
than had theretofore been necessary in order to attribute the element
of coercion to employers' statements.
2
'
Under the Wagner Act there developed a closely related test for
determining the existence of coercion: the "compulsory" or "captive"
audience doctrine as formulated in NLRB v. Clark Brothers Com-
pany.22 Speeches not in themselves coercive, but made on company
time, on company property, and to which the employees were required
to listen, were found to be an unfair labor practice. This conclusion
was attained by examining the setting in which those speeches were
given.
Many vociferous employers, however, protested against an ap-
plication of these tests on the ground that they were being effectively
deprived of their constitutional rights. Whether or not the criticism
levelled by employers against the tests applied under the Wagner
17 ,,. . [I]n determining whether a course of conduct amounts to restraint
or coercion, pressure exerted vocally by the employer may no more be disre-
garded than pressure exerted in other ways." Id. at 477.
18 Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U. S. 533 (1943).
19 134 F. Zd 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 768 (1943).
20 See Donnelley & Sons Co. v. NLRB, 156 F. 2d 416 (7th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 329 U. S. 810 (1947) ; NLRB v. Lettie Lee, Inc., 140 F. 2d 243
(9th Cir. 1944) ; NLRB v. Reynolds Wire Co., 121 F. 2d 627 (7th Cir. 1941) ;
Van Raalte, Inc., 69 N. L. R. B. 1326 (1946); Agar Packing & Provision
Corp., 58 N. L. R. B. 738 (1944).
21 See Hercules Motors Corp., 73 N. L. R. B. 650 (1947); Fisher Gov-
ernor Co., 71 N. L. R. B. 1291 (1946).
22 163 F. 2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947). Contra: NLRB v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 157 F. 2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946).
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Act had a sound basis in fact, it was in order to correct any inequity
that the present law was enacted.23 Although the new section may
be applicable to both employer and employee, one of its primary pur-
poses was ". . . to protect the right of free speech when what the
employer says or writes is not of a threatening nature or does not
promise a prohibited favorable discrimination." 24 That the threat
necessary to take a statement outside the protection of the section need
not be an express threat is illustrated by the legislative history. It
was provided in the House Bill that a statement was not to constitute
or be evidence of an unfair practice unless, by its own express terms,
it threatened reprisal. 25  The section as finally enacted, however,
omitted that requirement. As a result, the section also prohibits
implied threats or promises, but just what may be considered as giving
rise to such implication is a question of construction.
Judicial Construction of Section 8(c)
The first definite change wrought by the new provision was the
immediate rejection by the Board of the "captive audience" test in
determining whether an employer's speech is coercive.26 It is still
considered an unfair labor practice, however, for an employer to deny
to a union the opportunity of answering any adverse charges con-
tained in a speech given on company time, where the union has no
other reasonable forum in which to present its case.2 7 The proscribed
unfairness lies, not in the employer's speech, but in the company's
refusal to permit solicitation by the union.28  But the employer need
not provide the union with a rebuttal period every time he makes a
speech, so long as the "avenues of communication" are kept open.29
In substance, the employer may lawfully make such speeches pro-
vided he does not have a discriminatory "no-solicitation" rule.30
With regard to the "totality of conduct" doctrine, the present
picture is somewhat less clear. Shortly after Section 8(c) was en-
acted, the National Labor Relations Board expressed the view that
the provision substantially increased the protection previously granted
23 SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947).
24H. R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947) (emphasis added).
25 H. R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1947).2 6 Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N. L. R. B. 577 (1948). "... [Tihe language
of section 8(c) . . . and its legislative history, make it clear that the doctrine
of the Clark Bros. case no longer exists as a basis for finding unfair labor
practices ... ." Id. at 578. See Hinde & Dauch Paper Co., 78 N. L. R. B.
488, 489 (1948).
2T See Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co., 98 N. L. R. B. 11, 13 (1952);
Bernardin Bottle Cap Co., 97 N. L. R. B. 1559 (1952); see Bonwit Teller, Inc.
v. NLRB, 197 F. 2d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1952) (appeal pending before Supreme
Court).
28 Ibid.
2 9 See Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, supra note 27, at 646.30Ibid.
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employers under the original Act,31 and a number of its decisions
during that period apparently sustain this opinion.32 This was due
to a literal construction of the new statute, limiting the Board to a
consideration of the words of the speech uninfluenced by outside
factors. At the same time, however, the "totality" doctrine was ap-
plied in other cases much as it was before the 1947 amendment.33
When the issue reached the courts of appeal, the tendency was to
uphold these latter decisions by giving Section 8(c) a liberal inter-
pretation, some courts going so far as to consider it merely a re-
statement of the principles embodied in the Constitution.3 4 It is diffi-
cult to determine in all cases, however, whether or not the "totality"
doctrine has been adopted in its entirety.
In NLRB v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills,3 5 the defendant-
company pleaded the protection afforded in Section 8(c) as a defense
in an action based on certain statements made to, and questions asked
of, its employees. The court asserted that when these utterances are
considered in connection with the circumstances in which they were
made, the Board's finding of an unfair practice was adequately sup-
ported. Again, in NLRB v. Kropp Forge Company,3 6 the Board had
issued a cease and desist order against the company based, in part,
upon statements of the company's representatives which were merely
expressive of an anti-union sentiment.3 7 Although Section 8(c) was
pleaded in defense, the order was affirmed on appeal, the court hold-
ing that whether or not the words of an employer constitute an unfair
practice depends upon the respective positions of the parties, their
backgrounds and general conduct. Thus, the statute has not impaired
the power of the Board to enjoin statements which form part of a
coercive pattern. The LaSalle Steel 38 case, in which a similar con-
clusion had been reached a short time before, was cited with approval
in the Kropp Forge case.
These cases established a standard for interpreting the new pro-
vision, which standard has been applied in subsequent decisions of
the Board and the courts.3 9 In a recent case it was asserted, by way
31 13 NLRB ANN. REP. 49 (1948).
32 See Burns Brick Co., 80 N. L. R. B. 389 (1948) ; Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
77 N. L. R. B. 577 (1948); Tygart Sportswear Co., 77 N. L. R. B. 613 (1948).
33 See Red Rock Co., 84 N. L. R. B. 521 (1949) ; see Abercrombie Co., 83
N. L. R. B. 524, 530 (1949). But cf. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 81
N. L. R. B. 557, 559 (1949).34 See NLRB v. Bailey Co., 180 F. 2d 278, 280 (6th Cir. 1950) ; NLRB v.
La Salle Steel Co., 178 F. 2d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S.
963 (1950).
35 175 F. 2d 675 (5th Cir. 1949).
38 178 F. 2d 822 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 810 (1950).
37 The specific statements were, for example, "Listen, Bill, I don't want no
organization in here"; and, "We don't want the A. F. of L. in here. They
won't do us any good." Id. at 824-25.
38 178 F. 2d 829 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 963 (1951).
39 See NLRB v. Nabors, 196 F. 2d 272 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 73
of dicta, that employers are required to maintain an attitude of strict
neutrality. 40 This type thinking constitutes a throw-back to the
earlier cases decided under the original Wagner Act.41  Other deci-
sions, though not using these terms, have nevertheless considered the
employer's background and the surrounding circumstances in deter-
mining the coercive nature of his speeches.42 This does not neces-
sarily mean, however, that the employer's speech will be rendered
coercive merely because he has shown some anti-union tendencies in
the past. It is in each case a question of degree, but a great deal of
weight still seems to rest upon the presence or absence of outside
factors, rather than upon the literal phraseology of the statute.
Thus, in NLRB v. Sidran,43 speech which contained no threat
or promise was properly held not to be such as would reasonably
tend to intimidate.44 The reason appeared to be, however, not merely
the fact that it lacked the prohibited elements, but also because from
the entire record it could not be deemed coercive. The court cited
the Virginia Electric & Power Company case, among others which
were decided upon the principles there employed in construing the
Wagner Act.45 Similarly, in NLRB v. Bradley Wash fountain Com-
pany,46 it was held that certain communications to striking employees
were insufficient to constitute unfair practice. Again the basis for
the decision was not the lack of coercion in the words themselves, but
primarily the fact that the strike was an economic one, not caused
by any act of the employer.
4 7
Although the "totality of conduct" doctrine continues to be ap-
plied in substance, the courts rarely refer directly to it as such. In
support of their conclusions, they do, however, cite those cases in
which it was employed prior to the amendment. It appears therefore,
that Section 8(c) has made little, if any, change in the manner there-
tofore employed in distinguishing between coercive and non-coercive
Sup. Ct. 106 (1952) ; NLRB v. Mayer, 196 F. 2d 286 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Happ
Bros. Co., 90 N. L. R. B. 1513 (1950).
40 See Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. NLRB, 194 F. 2d 407, 410 (7th Cir.
1952).
41 See note 10 supra.
42 See note 39 supra.
43 181 F. 2d 671 (5th Cir. 1950).
44 That the statements need not actually have intimidated the employees is
illustrated by NLRB v. Valley Broadcasting Co., 189 F. 2d 582 (6th Cir.
1951); Red Rock Co., 84 N. L. R. B. 521 (1949); Chicopee Mfg. Corp.,
85 N. L. R. B. 1439 (1949).
45 The other cases cited were: Big Lake Oil Co. v. NLRB, 146 F. 2d 967
(5th Cir. 1945); NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F. 2d 993 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 768 (1943).
46 192 F. 2d 144 (7th Cir. 1951).
47 In the course of the opinion, Judge Lindley makes an excellent classifi-
cation of the various situations arising between employer and employee and
the corresponding need for restriction on the employer's statements in each
instance. Id. at 152-53.
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speech. The statute, in this respect, has been so construed as to ren-
der it almost nugatory. Just what factors will influence the decision
in any particular case depends, of course, upon the peculiar facts
involved; but an accurate prediction has become even more difficult
than in the ordinary situations because of the general and seemingly
evasive language in some of the opinions.48  In any event, the out-
come does not depend upon an application of Section 8(c). Aside
from its effect upon the "compulsory audience" doctrine, that provi-
sion has served chiefly to confuse.
Conchsion
Words, by their very nature, derive their import from the en-
vironment in which they are uttered. Those, which at one time and
in one set of circumstances convey a certain meaning, may, at other
times have quite different, even entirely opposite connotations. Much
depends upon the speaker, his relation to his audience, and innumer-
able, sometimes intangible, but none the less potent emotional and
psychological factors. A group of people can all listen to the same
speech or read the same book, and when finished, should one ask each
to explain its meaning, there would often be as many explanations
as there are people. In any attempt to ascertain the effect of certain
words upon a particular person or group of persons, therefore, to
look at the words alone, as in a vacuum, is but to begin the
investigation.
With these elementary and well recognized principles 49 in mind,
it seems a surprisingly naive attitude to suppose that they need not
apply in the field of labor relations. Of all areas, that is one in which
they most definitely should apply. Yet, Section 8(c) of the Taft-
Hartley Act is so worded that it would, if interpreted literally, exclude
from consideration all but the unadorned words of the speaker or
writer. True, the words need not contain an express threat or prom-
ise in order to constitute unfair practice, 0 but if they are to be held
coercive they must contain, at least impliedly, those prohibited ele-
48 See NLRB v. Valley Broadcasting Co., supra note 44, wherein words
were held to be unfair because they were "... in their general tenor, coercive
and alluring in their nature." Id. at 586.49Judge Learned Hand expressed these principles in a highly artistic man-
ner, as follows: "Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have
only a communal existence; and not only does the meaning of each inter-
penetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take their purport from the set-
ting in which they are used, of which the relation between the speaker and
the hearer is perhaps the most important part." NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121
F. 2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941). In determining the relation between speaker
and hearer, however, it is not enough merely to discover that it is one of em-
ployer and employee. One should go further before attributing to language a
coercive character.
50 See note 25 supra.
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NOTES
ments. Certainly the statute cannot mean that the implication is to
be derived from outside circumstances and conditions, for that would
in no way have altered the method employed before the statute was
passed. It is submitted that the confusion present in the cases since
1947 is the result of a conflict created by the statute as it was finally
enacted. This conflict arose because a literal interpretation of the sec-
tion would have been in direct contradiction to the inherent nature
of the spoken or written word, and a liberal interpretation would
have nullified the provision. The courts, in an attempt to reconcile
these two extremes, and still arrive at a just determination on each
occasion, resorted to language which was, in essence, declaratory of
prior law but which, because of an awareness of the statute, was
couched in confusing and misleading terms. It is further submitted
that the practical solution lies in legislatively eliminating the present
problem from the provision. A re-drafting may be necessary in order
to retain advances made under it in other directions, 51 but no attempt
should be made to set an arbitrary standard for ascertaining the
effect of words. This is an area for the exercise of administrative
and judicial discretion, and more reliance should be placed upon the
courts to balance the conflicting interests and to obtain substantial
justice according to the demands of each dispute.
M
A PROPOSAL FOR COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN NEw YORK
Introduction
In essence, negligence is the doing of an act without care, or the
failure to perform an act, the performance of which is dictated by
care. The degree of care to be exercised in a given factual situation
is commensurate with the danger to be avoided.1 Negligence is ac-
tionable only where an injured plaintiff shows: that a duty was owing
by the defendant to him to exercise care; 2 an act or omission whereby
defendant violated that existing duty; 3 that the defendant's negli-
3' An example is the principle that an anti-union speech by the employer
may not be used as a motivating factor for subsequent alleged anti-union ac-
tivity on the part of the employer, if such speech is non-coercive in character.
Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 180 F. 2d 731 (6th Cir. 1950), aff'd, 340 U. S.
498 (1951).
I Barbato v. Vollmer, 273 App. Div. 169, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 528 (3d Dep't
1948).
2 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).3 Johnson v. City of New York, 208 N. Y. 77, 101 N. E. 691 (1913).
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